In present-day debates over electoral reform in developed Anglo-Saxon democracies, there are two electoral systems that feature prominently: the darling of early 21 st -century electoral engineers, mixed member systems; and the system that was much spoken about in debates over electoral system design at the start of the last century, the single transferable vote (STV).
methods, single non-transferable vote (SNTV) is the least preferred of the electoral systems. It is tied for the smallest number of first preferences, has the lowest average ranking and is a Condorcet loser.
This article moves on from that observation with two principal aims in mind. First, we seek to establish the basis of the supposed advantages of MMP over all other systems, which, as shall be shown, proves difficult because the basis of that advantage simply is not very clear. Second, we explore areas where electoral systems research in the next generation might move forward from the old chestnut of proportionality. The map of scholarly opinion towards electoral systems has some very well-defined topography over certain issues (notably proportionality), but in other respects the map might as well include the phrase 'here be dragons', for there is much that remains unknown. Our expert survey draws out some areas of thought on electoral systems where our collective expertise is lacking; this article uses the survey to set out those areas where we seem to need more research.
There are, of course, other ways of setting out a statement of what we know and where to go next than by relying on a survey of academic experts. We could, for example, present a review of the literature or some more personal reflections on how that literature strikes us. And, good examples of both can be found in the Gallagher and Mitchell study (2005) . But, studying the views of academics on their chosen subject allows us to hold up a different kind of mirror to our sense of what we have done and what we need to do. It allows us a glimpse into the gap between what we think and what we write. Essentially, in what follows, we point up some areas that we-as a scholarly community-are in agreement over, some we disagree over and, most importantly, some things that seem to shape our views on electoral systems in meaningful ways yet are not as well understood as we might like. There is, then, value in taking a small step back from the constraints of academic publishing to ask 'yes, but what do we really think-what do you like about these systems?'.
There is, of course, also the inevitable 'so what?' question. The point could be made that we might as well be surveying the views of soccer correspondents about their We would argue, on the contrary, that there is a very real point to this enterprise, and that relates to the highly significant practical role played by electoral system experts in influencing the design of electoral systems-whether it is Edward Nanson in Australia at the turn of the last century (Farrell and McAllister 2006) , or Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts in British regional assemblies in the 1990s, or Louis Massicotte in Quebec today. In Nanson's case it was STV that was being proposed (unsuccessfully); in the other two instances it was MMP (successfully). If it is the case that electoral system experts are having influence over the practicalities of electoral system design, then it is of considerable interest to scholarly debate to try and get a sense of the underlying factors that cause the experts to favour one system over another.
Inevitably the questions of 'what do we like about electoral systems?' and 'where to next in the study of electoral systems?' overlap, and this article weaves its way through both questions in a rather circuitous fashion. The place to begin, however, is with what we know-and what we know is proportionality.
Proportionality as a Universal Desideratum-but with Limits
One of the properties of scholarship on electoral systems is a very clear understanding of which of the systems promote proportionality and which do not. Moreover, proportionality is seen by most as a major desirable property of electoral systems (for an exception, see Pinto-Duschinsky 1999). Table 2 demonstrates this by noting that, among the most likely criteria for evaluating electoral systems, proportionality is a clear Condorcet winner. 8 The strong support for proportionality tallies with other evidence in the survey. For example, 83 per cent of respondents believe that in a society characterised by distinct cleavages and/or ethnic divisions the electoral system should be engineered to ensure that some representation of the relevant minority occurs. Similarly, 58 per cent believe that compensation schemes (awarding extra seats) are fine if they increase proportionality. Clearly, then, there is strong and consistent support for the criterion of proportionality as a desirable property of electoral systems.
There are two observations prompted by this commitment to proportionality. First, while it is a consistently stated preference and consistently stated criterion it is not entirely consistent with other opinions on electoral systems revealed by our survey: there are, in other words, some gaps. For example, in the ranking of desirable properties of electoral systems, 'helps ensure the representation of women and minorities' typically appears towards the bottom of the list. In addition the Condorcet loser in Table 2 is 'help ensure coalition government'. While coalition government is not an explicit goal of electoral systems there does exist a strong and well-known correlation between proportionality of electoral systems, multipartyism and coalition governments (for a summary, see Farrell 2001) . Furthermore, while nearly half (49 per cent) of respondents believe that governments Table 3 ).
In short, the principle of proportionality may be well supported, but its actual practice would seem to leave some doubts, at least in fairly 'pure' forms. Coalition government and multi-party politics may not be a goal of PR but they are the typical consequence and so, while there may be an analytical difference between proportionality and these other features, there may not be a meaningful one in the 'real world', and this slippage may give some people pause about PR and pure PR. This slippage may explain why there is not much support for pure proportionality: the majority in our survey (79 per cent) is of the view that there should be a minimum vote threshold before a party gains seats in the legislature, with the modal (and mean) threshold being around 5 per cent. The key seems to be that proportionality should not come at the cost of effective government-but where exactly the trade-off lies is not entirely clear.
A second observation is a curiosity: list PR-which is definitively associated with proportional outcomes-does not fare as well as MMP in our ranking of systems, a point touched upon in our previous paper (Bowler et al. 2005) . We can look at this in greater detail by seeing what criteria scholars identify. Here we address two sets of points that are inter-related: first we make a series of points about electoral systems and their effects; second, we make a number of points relating to the state of academic knowledge on electoral systems.
We asked our experts to rank seven electoral systems (SMP, Alternative Vote, runoff, single non-transferable vote, list, STV and MMP) on a number of traits. In Table 4 we focus on four key systems, examining how many scholars ranked a given system, in terms of a certain property, in the 'top' three, the 'bottom' three or in the middle category. In total, this produces a ranking of four electoral systems across six criteria for a total of 24 rankings. The criteria are displayed in the rough order in which these are held to be important in judging electoral systems, with proportionality as the most important criterion and cohesive parties as the least.
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As can be seen, on 12 of the 24 rankings, 80 per cent of scholars share the same assessment of a system as either being very good or very bad: for example, 81 per cent of scholars are of the view that SMP is not very good at delivering proportionality, while a commendable 100 per cent consider list systems as good for proportionality. There is, then, a real degree of consensus about the properties of electoral systems. It might sound a little pompous to call this 'knowledge', but these figures do show that scholars share assessments of electoral systems across a wide range of quite specific properties. And, what may well have turned the scale for MMP over list PR is that the former is more clearly associated with effective government and accountability than the latter (which may simply reflect the tendency of the longest-standing MMP system, Germany, to have two parties in government rather than multi-party coalitions).
But, for all this consensus, there are, nevertheless, areas of disagreement. The five rankings emboldened in Table 4 are the properties and systems about which scholarly opinion is more divided: either there is no clear majority, or there is at best a bare majority. Three of these relate to STV and its ability to provide effective government, accountability and cohesive parties. Two relate to divisions over the role of list systems in promoting accountability and constituency service.
Another way of looking at these proportions is to see just how certain we are as a group of scholars by looking at the maximum proportion for each property for each electoral system (i.e. the figures for good or bad, excluding the middle category). Given the importance the electoral system specialists attach to these criteria the patterns found in this survey are meaningful ones. At the risk of being overly self-congratulatory, it is hard to think of another field within political science in which scholars have similar levels of certainty about key features of their object of study. Having said that, there are some oddities in this set of results. First, one of the more surprising things in Table 4 is the consensus-indeed the certainty-over MMP and its effects, yet, apart from the post-war German case, this system is still relatively new and unproven, and the academic literature on it is not as well established as work on other systems (the few prominent examples of academic work on this system include Shugart and Wattenberg (2000)).
It is worth looking at this gap between academic opinion and academic literature a little more closely. The conventions of academic publishing lead us to express our views in a somewhat more constrained manner than we might like and also, perhaps, to express those views with fewer doubts than we might have. Of course, not all our thoughts should be written down or would hold up to the rigours of the publishing process. Nevertheless, one of the advantages of a survey of this kind is that it allows us to see some of the difference between what we think and what we write. Needless to say, gaining some very general and manageable picture of what we write is hard to do. One admittedly crude but nevertheless revealing guide is to search for relevant terms using Google and JSTOR and use the results of that search as an indication of how much is written on key topics. Table 5 reports the results of these searches and provides some evidence consistent with the claim that, despite the flourishing of detailed scholarly work in New Zealand (e.g. Vowles et al. 1998 Vowles et al. and 2004 , there is probably not as much written-and hence known-about MMP compared to other systems. There is, also, a very considerable body of work on proportionality.
What is it that makes MMP so popular? We examine some evidence using regression models to establish more clearly what kinds of values lead people to prefer one system over another. We use a set of survey instruments that tap into values of political outcomes and processes. We then use these measures to predict both absolute and relative rankings of electoral systems.
Tables 6 and 7 present results (in two different ways) from OLS models of rankings of systems based on some evidence on preferences. In Table 6 we present fairly straightforward models that take as their dependent variable the preference ranking (1, 2, 3, etc.) given to the (named) system and predict this using responses to a set of questions about democratic values and processes. To keep with the intuition of ranking the most preferred systems '1' (for 1 st ), the dependent variable is one where low numbers mean something is more highly rated. Table 6 provides evidence that some normative values are tied to evaluations of electoral systems. There is a straightforward component to the preferences for electoral systems: for example people who prefer one-party government prefer SMP (Table 6 column 1) and dislike list PR (Table 6 column 5). In terms of support for MMP in particular, then, we should note that among the values that generate support for MMP are attitudes towards political parties. Column 3 of Table 6 shows that higher rankings to MMP are given by people who think parties should work towards agreement rather than emphasise clear differences. Oddly, this same opinion generates support for SMP. Seeing parties as central actors also helps generate support for MMP (just, at the .10 level), while this depresses support for STV. Table 7 is slightly more complicated in that it looks at the difference in preference rankings of pairs of systems: a negative number means that the first-named system is rated more highly (e.g. a 1 st -ranked system minus a 6 th -ranked system); a positive number means the reverse. Of particular interest here are the comparisons between MMP and both the list systems of proportional representation and STV (the first three columns of this table). Again, the importance of having parties generate consensus (the first row of Table 7 ) is an important, if not the most important, value that generates the preference for MMP over its closest rival systems. Other factors do have an impact-most notably the value in having one person or several Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5 per cent; ** significant at 1 per cent; *** significant at 10 per cent preferred and so on. Taking the difference between two rankings then implies that: a NEGATIVE number means the first named system is preferred, a POSITIVE number means the second named system is preferred Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5 per cent; ** significant at 1 per cent; *** significant at 10 per cent representing an area. That is, presumably the single district component of MMP means it scores for some over STV and list systems. What we see here is that models predicting the evaluation of MMP perform worse than other models: the whole parameters are smaller, fewer pass conventional thresholds of statistical significance and measures of fit (R 2 ) are lower.
The patterns of support are open to a variety of interpretations. Our interpretation of the overall patterns in these tables is the following: even though MMP may be relatively highly rated, it is not clear why this is so. As experts we have quite clearly established and fairly well-defined preferences over two sorts of institutions-SMP and list systems-but have much less well-defined preferences over MMP and STV. The kinds of things that drive us to prefer these systems are, moreover, not well established in the literature. We can show this in the case of MMP, where to the extent that we can actually identify any values associated with support for this system, it is not entirely clear how these should fit. For instance, one reason for liking MMP is that we value consensus over clear differences (Table 7 cols 1 and 2 row 1). But is consensus a product of MMP? And, if so, how? It may be true for the German case but is it also true for other mixed member systems such as New Zealand's, or, indeed, Russia's mixed member majoritarian system? Another value that drives support for MMP seems to be a dislike of asking voters for preference rankings per se and a liking for one representative per district (Table 7 rows 2 and  3) . But these may not be well-established properties of MMP. It is not clear, for example, how much of a difference having 'a' representative makes to German voters. In short, then, the preference for MMP among our sample of experts is unmistakable, but the reasons for that preference, and for preferring MMP over list systems or STV, are not nearly so clear cut.
10

Proportionality, and Then What?
It is clear that we are not very certain about our knowledge on some key issues relating to electoral systems and governance: we know how to advise new democracies on how to achieve a proportional result, but we do not know how to accomplish things beyond that. Part of this probably reflects the fact that we are not entirely in agreement on some key issues over what should matter in a systemespecially regarding the role of parties. Parties, we agree, should reflect opinion and important divisions in society, but they should also exercise power. At that point we are-as a group-not so clear. Table 8 shows responses from some assessments of the trade-offs implied by electoral systems on a seven-point scale. The table reports the distribution of responses (percentages of respondents marking each of the seven points) as well as the mean ranking.
As can be seen, by and large our assessments put us-as a group-somewhere in the middle on each of the scales. We shade a little towards wanting clear difference between parties, and lean a little more strongly towards liking political parties and, also, favouring some idea of consensus. But all of these replies cluster in the middle of the scales. To be sure, some of that clustering around the mid-point is part and parcel of any scale like this, but what we do not see are the kinds of definite opinions that are visible in Table 4 . Nor is there a bimodal distribution of opinions; rather, what we see are responses that cluster towards the middle of the scale. Question: 'Different electoral systems often imply different kinds of trade-offs, or provide for the possibility of different kinds of political outcomes. We're interested in knowing which kinds of priorities matter more for you in an electoral system'. Note that the figures are percentages except for mean value which is score
Discussion
To paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, there are things we know we don't know and things we don't know we don't know. In this article we have pointed to some of the things that we know we don't know. We know all we could possibly need to know about proportionality but we don't know very much about governance. As dismissive as that sounds, we should be careful to underscore the very real accomplishment of the field of electoral studies: there is a great deal of consensus on a number of key issues. This kind of accomplishment is unusual within political science as a whole and we should recognise that accomplishment even as we consider 'where next?' There are some issues that we do seem to think are important-and possibly ones that colour our overall assessments of electoral systems-yet we probably know very little about. If, as a field of study, we were to break free from the fixation with proportionality and commit the Grofman 'heresy' of giving similar attention to other areas (Grofman 1999 ; see also Shugart 2005) , what other areas might we select for examination?
Many of the opinions we picked up in our survey seem to reflect an underlying sense of the conditional nature of electoral system effects. Some respondents told us that the answer to many questions was 'it depends', and this led a few to refuse to complete the survey. Despite this conditionality, and in the spirit of scholarly co-operation that characterises much of this field, many still went ahead and answered the questions as best they could. This 'it depends' answer, we think, is fair enough, but having said that it does not appear much in the literature. Otherwise, surely we would know more what the effects depend upon. Part of the reason for that may be because some electoral systems-most notably SMP and list PR-have quite pronounced effects and so there may be little need to qualify or hedge. But other systems, such as MMP or STV, are not so cut and dried, and conclusions about these systems may require more qualification or, perhaps, just more context. And, with that in mind, it is probably worth moving our attention to these other systems in order to establish some of the conditions under which electoral systems have given effects.
Bernie Grofman, for example, has for some time talked of electoral systems as 'embedded institutions' whose effects are likely to depend on other institutions and actors Bowler and Grofman 2000) . To be sure, Grofman is not alone in this. In a study of the varieties of Westminster which foreshadowed some subsequent findings to the effect that Westminster systems do not always produce 'Westminster' patterns, the doyen of British electoral systems research, David Butler, noted that 'one should be sceptical about attributing fixed qualities to electoral systems ... Although electoral systems are among the most quantifiable of political phenomena, they do not conform to mechanistic rules' (Butler 1983, 59 ; see also Blau 2003) . A next step is probably to produce a better developed sense of what the conditions are that help magnify or diminish electoral system effects.
Beyond establishing the conditions of effects we also seem to be relatively ill informed about, but nevertheless influenced by, our sense of what happens after the election is over. We don't really know much about what we consider an optimum number of parties for governability, but do seem to have the general sense that having lots of small parties (below 5 per cent) is too many and two might be too few. Obviously we are unlikely to arrive at a point estimate ('2.256') of the 'ideal' number of parties no matter what; especially since we might well be moving to elaborate more the conditional or embedded nature of electoral systems. But developing some sense of range might be good. Perhaps a better phrasing of what we are driving at is the following. Electoral studies might benefit from considering more of the issues 'downstream' from the election to take on board some of the lessons of coalition studies and also of governability more broadly. It seems likely that electoral systems provide incentives for those engaged in coalitional games, and maybe too much proportionality and possibly too much of a party-centred approach may be features that need to be leavened.
Again, this point can be read as underscoring some existing currents within electoral studies work. Recent work by Arend Lijphart (1999) and G. Bingham Powell (2002) on the political consequences of proportionality, for example, have started to address what happens after the election is over. Others too have pointed out that it is time to move on from our fetish for proportionality (see, e.g., Baker 1996) . But, this survey evidence clearly shows that with so many of us agreeing so thoroughly on proportionality and how it is achieved, it is hard to see what there is new to say on the topic. It is an unambiguous signal that it is time to move on and take the hints others have made more seriously.
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In sum, perhaps what seems to be our collective hunch that MMP is 'the best of both worlds' 12 is right. But, there is a deal of difference between having a conjecture and actually knowing something. Luckily, the electoral studies field is one thathistorically-has made great strides in moving us from conjecture to knowledge. 
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